Do also refer to this high-level writeup.
The keys are assigned to a combination of
verifier (e.g., Google, Reddit,
verifier_id (e.g., email, username), which is a unique
identifier respective to and provided by the
verifier. This assignment can be
triggered by any node and is decided through the nodes consensus layer.
The fundamental flow for Torus sign-in is as follows:
![Standard login with OAuth2 (Google, Facebook, Apple, Reddit, Discord, Twitch)](/contents/image (5).png>)
- Your application gets the user to sign-in via their preferred method (OAuth / email password / passwordless / verification code).
- After the user gives consent/verify his/her email, Torus SDK will receive an ID token and assign a key to the user depending on User Verifier ID from ID Token.
- The key is retrieved from the Torus network and exposed to Web3 provider (DApp) to complete user sign-in request.
- Torus uses this ID Token to check if the user’s profile information exists in
- If it does, the user will be signed in to the DApp with their preferred login.
- If it doesn’t, the user can create a new account on the DApp with their preferred login.
In order to allow for general verifiers to be used instead of only allowing OAuth, we typically need at least two of these APIs to be implemented by the external verifier:
- an API that issues unique tokens when a user is logged in.
- an API that consumes these tokens and returns user information as well as when the token was issued.
The first API must be accessible from the browser (e.g. CORS-enabled, restricted headers), in order to ensure that the Torus servers are not able to intercept the user's token (front-running).
Typically any entity that fulfills these two APIs and provides signatures on unique ID strings and timestamp can be a verifier. This is extendable to several authentication schemes, including existing authentication standards like OAuth Token flow and OpenID Connect.
In order to prevent a rogue node, or the Torus servers, from front-running you by taking your token, impersonating your login, and thereby stealing your key, we use a commitment scheme on our token similar to Bracha's Reliable Broadcast, to ensure that all nodes can be sure that a threshold number of other nodes are aware of the commitment, before it is finally revealed.
The general approach is as follows: we ensure that the front-end gets access to the token first, creates a commitment to the token and a temporary public-private keypair, and reveals the token only if a threshold number of nodes accept this commitment. The nodes will then use this keypair to encrypt the shares before sending it to the user.
This is done by generating a temporary public-private keypair in the front-end. The front-end calls the first API and receives an authentication token. This token is hashed, and the front-end sends the token hash and the temporary public key to each node, and each node returns a signature on this message, if this is the first time they have seen this token commitment. A bundle of these signatures is the proof, and submitting the proof together with the plain (unhashed token) to each node results in the node responding with a key share that is encrypted with the temporary public key.
Attack 1: Front-runner intercepts the original commitment request and sends a modified public key
In this case, the user will not receive a threshold number of signatures, and thus will not reveal their token. They will then be required to login again and request for a new token. Since the requests to the nodes are made in a random order, eventually a threshold honest set can be reached before a front-runner receives the commitment request.
Attack 2: Front-runner intercepts the reveal request and resends it to other nodes
Since a public key is already associated with the token in the commitment request, nodes will only respond with encrypted shares. Even if a front-runner intercepts the encrypted shares, they will be unable to decrypt it.